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Introduction & the Problèmatique 
The abiding paradox of plenty in 
Africa is that whereas the continent 
is rich its people are poor – in many 
cases extremely so. Africa is 
extravagantly endowed not only with 
much-coveted energy resources such 
as oil and gas, but also with huge 
deposits of mineral resources, 
including those, such as uranium, 
that drive the great powers‟ 
armament and nuclear industries. In 
the Gulf of Guinea (GoG), abundant 
oil and gas resources and their 
massive petro-dollars spin-offs have 
yet to transform any of the states 
from poverty to wealth spiking 
tension, conflict and violence. Only 
by engaging in true and holistic 
transformation of the political 
economy of oil and gas can national 
sovereignty become meaningful, 
foreign interests attenuated and 
peace and security won and 
consolidated. 
 
Much of the literature speaks to 
„resource curse‟; the main argument 
being that “the extraction of oil by 
countries in Africa and other parts of 
the developing world nearly always 
leads to political repression, 
corruption and violence” (Klare and 
Volman, 2006: 625; See also Soysa, 
2011:36 and Donner, 2009: 22-24). 
Weszkalynys (2009, 2011) blames 
crude oil for the underdevelopment 
of oil-rich African states and the 
common denominators of instability 
and violence in those countries. 
Pervasive sleaze and graft in the oil 
sector explains much, but not all, of 
so-called „resource curse‟. In the 
GoG states, there is paucity of 
information about how oil contracts 
are awarded and how much major 
transnational oil companies (TOCs) 
pay to African governments. Also, 
these companies often fail to play by 
the rules of the game. Thus, there is 
nothing deterministic about the so-
called „Dutch disease‟. As Terry Karl 
(in Southall, 2009: 29) has argued, 
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“the Dutch disease is not automatic. 
The extent to which it takes effect is 
largely the result of decision-making 
in the public realm”. 
 
By most accounts, Africa in general 
and West Africa in particular, are 
witnessing an “unprecedented boom 
in oil and gas investments” (Southall, 
2009: 10). It is the era of the second 
scramble for the continent‟s 
enormous energy and mineral 
resources. As was the case during the 
first scramble for Africa‟s territories 
and wealth in the late 19
th
 Century, 
the majority of African people have 
gained precious little and lost 
enormously. The new scramble is 
spear-headed by resource-hungry 
great powers such as the US, China, 
EU, Japan with several emerging 
powers – such as Russia, Brazil, 
Mexico, Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Venezuela – following their lead. 
The scramble is taking place within 
the context of the US-led post 9/11 
militarization and securitization 
policies and alliances in which 
several national and supranational 
actors and forces are unevenly 
implicated. These include 
international financial institutions 
(IFIs), states, TOCs and 
national/state corporations. Others 
are indigenous companies, African 
petro-elites and oil-
bearing/producing communities 
(Obi, 2009: 190). The latter include 
the Niger Delta (Nigeria), the 
Cabinda region (Angola) and the 
Bioko Island (Equatorial Guinea). 
Little attention has been paid to the 
welfare of the local or indigenous 
people and to their immediate 
ecology (Southall, 2009: 15). 
 
Virtually all the great powers, as key 
external actors, exhibit a 
combination of what Southall (2009) 
refers to as “good intentions, self-
interest, naked imperialism and 
outright hypocrisy”. This largely 
explains the yawning gap between 
precept and practice; between Mane 
(2005: 3)‟s characterization of the 
GoG as “endowed with abundant 
natural resources which, if carefully 
managed, can contribute to global 
prosperity” and the stark reality of 
mass poverty and deepening 
underdevelopment on the ground. 
Thus, while the scramble for the 
continent‟s resources has apparently 
boosted foreign investment in the 
extractive sector – three GoG states 
feature among Africa‟s top ten FDI 
destinations between 2011 and 2012: 
Nigeria (6.2 per cent, 4
th
); Angola 
(5.2 per cent, 7th) and Ghana (3. 7 
per cent; 9
th
) – this has done little to 
ameliorate the material lives of the 
people. On the contrary, the 
scramble for more oil and gas has 
made things worse for Africans. This 
is because it merely extracts natural 
resources but does not develop the 
local economy (Southall, 2009: 10; 
Yohannes, 2003: 12). The net effect 
is that GoG states have “a very rich 
share of the riches natural capital but 
not physical and human capital” 
(Soysa, 2011: 36).       
 
The section of West and Central 
Africa with an impressive outlay of 
oil and gas resources is referred to in 
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global energy strategic terms as the 
Gulf of Guinea (Obi, 2009a). The 
scrambling for Africa‟s oil and gas 
can hardly be separated from the 
general scrambling for Africa. For 
Obi (2009: 198), “the scramble for 
oil in Africa was literally embedded 
in the scramble for Africa”. This 
scramble has also been enmeshed 
with trans-global processes and 
actors.  
 
The major problèmatique of this 
piece is that the GoG is a highly 
contested and complex terrain and 
context in which foreign interests 
often outmuscle national sovereignty 
with unpleasant consequences. The 
epicenter or centre of gravity is the 
Niger Delta where it appears „boys‟ 
and „barons‟ operate freely. Illicit 
bunkering is a reaction of the 
commons – the activities of the 
„boys‟ are only a tip of the iceberg 
compared to those of the „barons‟, 
that is, a coterie of key state, military 
and TOCs‟ officials – to the 
hallowing out of the state since the 
mid-1980s and its lamentable 
absence from the social provisioning 
of basic public goods and values. 
African governments have their work 
cut out for them: they should put 
their houses in order; become more 
effective relative autonomous actors 
in the global stage and work for the 
good of the greatest number of their 
people.    
 
Profiling the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) 
The Gulf of Guinea (GoG) region is 
the north-east most part of the 
Tropical Atlantic Ocean. It is almost 
as vast as the Gulf of Mexico and 
provides shipping lifeline for no 
fewer than twelve nations (Schneider 
and Vircoulon, 2013). The region 
and its conflict system consist of 
fourteen states: Angola, Benin, 
Cameroon, Chad, Congo Brazzaville, 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), Equatorial-Guinea, Gabon, 
Ghana, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Nigeria, 
Sao Tome et Principe and Sierra 
Leone. This region which traverses 
West and Central Africa excels as 
one of the globe‟s top oil and gas 
exploration sites. New offshore oil 
was recently discovered in Liberia, 
Cote d‟Ivoire and Ghana. 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) boasts of 
about 80 billion barrels of oil. 24 
billion of this – that is, 30 per cent of 
the total, representing eight per cent 
of the world reserves -- is found in 
the GoG. This makes the region 
potentially “the world‟s leading deep 
water offshore production centre” 
(Servant and Forster, 2003: 140). 
The region is ahead in terms of both 
average reserves and productivity of 
the sub-sea wells. It is estimated that 
by 2020 some 770 million barrels of 
West African oil would be consumed 
by the US (Yohannes, 2003: 10). 
One in every four barrels of oil 
produced comes from this region 
with Nigeria and Angola accounting 
for nearly four million barrels per 
day (bpd), that is, almost half of 
Africa‟s output (Watts, 2008: 28).  
 
With about 5.4 million bpd of crude 
oil produced in 2012, Nigeria and 
Angola accounted, respectively, for 
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47 and 34 per cent of the output 
(Okafor and Ezeobi, 2013). Nearly 
40 per cent and 29 per cent of oil 
consumed, respectively, in North 
America and Europe pass through 
this region. Ten years ago, it was 
predicted that the GoG‟s estimated 
reserves of 24 billion barrels of oil 
would become the world‟s leading 
deep water offshore production 
centre (Servant and Forster, 2003: 
140). By the end of 2012, the region 
held some 4.5 per cent of the world‟s 
oil reserves and three per cent of 
proven gas reserves much of which 
remains untapped. 
 
Further, gas reserves and total gas 
production are put at over 80 billion 
cubic meters with Algeria accounting 
for two-thirds (Southall, 2009: 14). 
A quarter of Africa‟s eight per cent 
of the world‟s proven reserves of 
natural gas are located in the GoG. 
Nigeria has the largest reserves in 
SSA and is second only to Algeria as 
the continent‟s most important gas 
exporter. The gas reserves in 
Nigeria‟s Niger Delta region are 
thought to be at least one and a half 
times that of oil in energy terms with 
its development still in its early days 
(Olusakin, 2006: 221). The Nigerian 
Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) 
production capacity is estimated at 
about 73.7 billion cubic meters and 
is bested only by Qatar (BMI 2013). 
So significant is the natural gas here 
that there have been high-level 
political talks about constructing a 
Trans-Sahara pipeline to take natural 
gas from the Niger Delta to Algeria 
with a view to reducing Europe‟s 
energy dependence on Russia.        
 
For the great powers, the GoG has 
emerged as the new Persian Gulf in 
terms of its capacity to meet their oil 
demands (Obi, 2009: 94). It is, for 
example, likely to supply a quarter of 
US oil imports by 2015 (The 
Economist, 25 May 2013). This 
explains why these countries have 
sought to access and control the 
reserves by both fair and foul means 
with scant regard for the national 
sovereignty of the oil-rich states and 
the human security of their growing 
population. According to Obi (2009: 
88), the US‟ abiding interest in West 
and Central Africa‟s rapidly 
expanding source of oil and gas has 
led it to decide that the region‟s 
extreme instability deserves to be 
prevented “from becoming a site for 
terrorist attacks against western 
interests”.       
 
The international geo-strategic 
importance of the GoG‟s oil and gas 
reserves lies in several mutually 
reinforcing factors: attractive oil 
fields many of them off-shore and 
deep off-shore, far removed from 
conflict zones in the oil-bearing 
states; fine, sulphur-free and sweet 
quality oil that highly recommends 
itself to key major markets in the US, 
EU and Asia; and a relatively stable 
oil production environment. The 
GoG oil has been described as 
“lighter, higher-valued crude oils 
that are tailor-made for US East 
Coast markets” (Volman, 2003: 
574). Obi (2009: 207) adds that “oil 
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in West and Central Africa is one of 
the most highly prized strategic 
interests in the world today”.   
 
Perhaps the most important factor is 
that, for all the conflict in much of 
the region, the conditions stipulated 
in oil contracts by the states are 
arguably the most lucrative and most 
profitable globally. Also, the risk-
reward equation in doing business in 
Africa, particularly in resource-rich 
states, is very attractive because, for 
Ernst and Young (2013), “the returns 
remain among the highest in the 
world”. Extremely generous contract 
terms have, undoubtedly, attracted 
the major TOCs to the region. The 
„Big Six‟ – Exxon Mobil, Shell, BP, 
Total, Conoco, and Philips – control 
about 63 per cent of the subsea 
market projects in West Africa. Off 
the Angolan coast alone, Exxon 
Mobil reportedly controlled, in 2003, 
some 12 acres of oil in concessions 
which contained 7.5 billion barrels of 
oil (Yohannes, 2003: 7-8). Similarly, 
oil, gas and other natural resources 
have driven high economic growth 
since 2000, but foreign direct 
investments (FDIs) in non-extractive 
industries such as agriculture, 
manufacturing, construction and 
services have also played a key role 
in the growth (Roll, 2011; Melber 
and Southall, 2009: xix; Ernst and 
Young, 2013). Political instability 
and violence appeared, however, to 
have taken their toll over the years 




Oil and Gas 
- Nigeria 
 
Nigeria has been described as “the 
most important producer of oil and 
gas on the (African) continent and 
petro-state of most geo-strategic 
concern to the US” (Watts, 2008: 
27). By 2011, Nigeria was 
Washington‟s fifth largest oil 
supplier, after Canada, Saudi Arabia, 
Mexico and Venezuela. In 2012, the 
country‟s crude represented five per 
cent of share of US oil imports. 
Depending on the sources, by 2010, 
the country‟s proven oil reserves 
were estimated at either between 16 
and 22 billion barrels or above 37.2 
billion barrels. The latter figure 
represents 2.68 per cent of global 
reserves. Nigeria is the largest 
producer of sweet oil in the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC). The Nigerian 
National Petroleum Company 
(NNPC), created in 1979, is the state 
oil corporation through which the 
country participates in the petroleum 
industry. It currently holds 60 per 
cent participation in the industry 
(Ajayi, 2013). It has been plagued, 
over the years, by inefficiency, 
waste, opacity and endemic 
corruption. It has built up a sordid 
reputation for under-reporting the 
country‟s oil sales and revenues. 
Shell, which began operation in 
Nigeria in 1936, is the foremost TOC 
in the country. The other high-profile 
companies are Chevron, 
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Nigeria‟s proven natural gas reserves 
are estimated at about 200 trillion 
cubic feet (tfc), about 2.82 per cent 
of global reserves and three times as 
substantial as oil reserves. By 2010, 
it had become a major exporter of 
LNG to the EU and the US. 
Particularly coveted is the Bonny 
Island Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) 
plant, which has an annual output 
capacity of 17 million tons; an 
annual output of 2.5 tons of liquefied 
petroleum gas (PLG) and a million 
tons per annum of condensates. New 
plants, such as Nigeria Liquefied 
Natural Gas (NLNG) Project, 
Escravos Gas-Gathering Project and 
Oso Natural Gas Liquefied Project, 
are either currently operational or are 
in the pipeline (Ajayi, 2013). In 
2011, while the NLNG exports to the 
US substantially declined, its exports 
to Japan more than tripled (USEIA, 
„Nigeria‟). 
 
Nigeria is, by far, the GoG‟s major 
oil and gas player with the Niger 
Delta as its epicenter, as already 
indicated. Between 2009 and 2011, 
the country earned $ 143.5 billion in 
equity crude sales, royalty, signature 
bonuses and taxes. During the same 
period it lost over 136 million barrels 
of oil estimated at $109 billion to oil 
theft and sabotage. 10 million barrels 
valued at $894 million were also lost 
as a result of pipeline vandalism in 
onshore operations (NEITI-EITI 
Core Audit Report of Oil and Gas, 




- Angola  
Africa‟s third biggest economy, after 
South Africa and Nigeria, with a 
GDP of over $104 billion in 2011, 
Angola was also one of the fastest 
growing economies in the first 
decade of the 2000s. This was due to 
significant FDI capital inflows into 
the country‟s vast oil and gas 
industry. Steady investment in the 
energy infrastructure since the end of 
the devastating 27 year civil war 
(1975-2002) has gradually 
modernized the sector. The official 
goal of the country‟s current 
National Development Plan (NDP), 
2013-2017, is to create a new Angola 
by giving priority to private 
investment to diversify the economy 
and create jobs. Unlike Nigeria, 
several industries have developed 
around the oil and gas industry. Over 
$40 billion in FDI between 2003 and 
2011 – mainly from the US, the UK, 
France, China and Brazil – has 
boosted the country‟s economic 
diversification. In the past decade, 
dependence on oil exports has been 
reduced from 98 to 75 per cent of 
government revenues. Sonangol, its 
national oil company, created in 
1976, operates nearly twenty 
subsidiaries in the oil, natural gas 
and allied industries. (USEIA, 
„Angola‟).  
 
Angola‟s oil and gas are essentially 
offshore. It has proven oil reserves of 
9.5 billion barrels, medium-to-light 
crude with low sulphur content. It 
more than doubled its oil production 
from 896,000 barrels per day (bpd) 
in 2002 to 1.84 million bpd in 2011, 
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the largest shares -- 38 per cent and 
14 per cent, respectively -- going to 
China and the US. The government 
plans to produce 2 million barrels per 
day by 2014.  
 
By the end of 2011, Angola had 
proven reserves of natural gas of 
10.95 trillion cubic feet (tcf), second 
only to Nigeria. The production of 
natural gas has grown from 98 
billion cubic feet (bcf) in 1990 to 
379 bcf in 2011. Its LNG, a 
partnership between Sonangol (the 
state oil corporation), Chevron, ENI 
and Total, is expected to last for at 
least 30 years. The first LNG cargo 
was shipped in June 2013.   
 
- Equatorial Guinea (EG)       
The Oil and Gas Journal indicates 
that by January 2012 Equatorial 
Guinea (EG) had proven oil reserves 
of 1.1 billion barrels and produced 
about 320, 000 barrels of oil per day 
in 2011. This makes her the third 
largest oil producer on the African 
continent. Like Nigeria, the energy 
sector represents over 90 per cent of 
government revenue and nearly 98 
per cent of export earnings. Oil 
production is expected to peak at 
331, 200 barrels per day in 2016 
after which decline would set in 
except there are new discoveries as 
well as new exploration and 
production investments (BMI, 2013).  
EG has a Gross National Product 
(GNP) per capita of a little over 
$25,000. Yet, according to the World 
Bank, 78 per cent of the citizens live 
beneath the national poverty line and 
most on less than a dollar a day 
(Shook, 2013).       
 
The Ministry of Mines, Industry and 
Energy regulates the oil industry, but 
a national company, the GE Petrol, 
became operational in 2002. 
Sonagas, the national gas company, 
was created in January 2005. By 
January 2012, EG had an estimated 
1.3 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of proven 
natural gas reserves. Its production 
increased from a billion cubic feet to 
238 bcf between 2001 and 2010, as 
new projects got underway. The 
country‟s main LNG exports are to 
Asian and Latin American countries 
as well as to Kuwait. Like Nigeria – 
but unlike Angola – EG is an EITI 
member, but, according to Mouawad 
(2009), this may be no more than a 
fig leaf for dictatorship. 
 
Conceptual and Theoretical 
Framework 
There are interesting conceptual and 
theoretical linkages in the GoG 
between, on the one hand, national 
sovereignty, foreign interests and 
local bunkering and, on the other, 
space, resources and states over 
which TOCs, foreign governments, 
IFIs and petro elites project their 
power and compete. It is a dynamic 
and complex relation of hegemony 
and subordination potentially 
creating both a potentially explosive 
conflict system.  
 
For one, sophisticated and powerful 
TOCs, whose monopoly of the 
relations of production gives them 
significant power and leverage, have 
become habituated to deploying 
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increasingly significant resources in 
the lucrative oil and gas industry at 
the expense of the state and the local 
oil-bearing/producing communities 
(Obi, 2011: 107). “Power”, writes 
Cronin (2008: 238), “is fluid, 
dynamic and relational. It is like 
electricity; you use it or lose it. It 
cannot be stored away indefinitely. 
Power is not a fixed, isolated object 
to be possessed or secured …”   
 
For another, as more West and 
Central African states discovered and 
produced more offshore oil and gas, 
the GoG has become “one of the 
most dangerous maritime areas in the 
world” (International Crisis Group, 
2012: i). The region has witnessed 
the destabilization of the maritime 
economy and coastal states by 
violent trans-national crime and 
growing piracy activities as well as 
an upsurge in the activities of 
criminal groups along the coasts of 
Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Benin and Togo 
(ibid.). 
 
The response of the big oil 
companies has been, first, to police 
their immediate environment and, 
second, to get their home 
governments to articulate 
militarization policies to ensure 
energy security for themselves in the 
region. This is a largely physical 
security response, shorn of a basic 
human needs approach vis-à-vis 
those most victimized by the gas and 
oil industry in the region. It has 
proved inadequate to address what 
the west refers to as a „new threat 
paradigm‟ present in so-called 
ungoverned spaces (Watts, 2008:27) 
in the GoG geo-political zone and 
the Sahelo-Saharan belt. Looming 
large both in the background and in 
the foreground is the danger 
supposedly posed, in these spaces, to 
western interests by emergent 
political/radical Islam and 
supposedly weak and failing African 
states (Obi, 2009: 89, 91).   
 
The central governments in the GoG 
have been too fragile to rein in the 
TOCs and the great powers. Already 
paralyzed by various regimes of the 
economic structural adjustment 
programs (SAPs) stipulated by the 
World Bank and the IMF since the 
mid-1980s, the states and the TOCs 
have become extremely “wedded 
together in transnational extraction 
and sharing of oil profits” (Obi, 
2011: 107). Abundant oil revenues 
have strengthened the ruling elites in 
these countries against critical 
domestic constituencies to the extent 
of ignoring their legitimate 
aspirations and demands. They have 
become so extraverted and beholding 
to the oil companies, their parent 
governments and to the World Bank 
and the IMF, among others, that they 
lack the capacity and the will to rein 
them in to respect their national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
There is little or no trade-off between 
sovereignty and the collective good; 
it is an apparent case of „neither nor‟. 
The „resource curse‟ finds fullest 
expression here. Oliveira (in Roll, 
2011) has argued that the GoG is the 
„worst case scenario‟ among 
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resource wealthy states: “every 
structural pre-requisite is missing for 
sound use of oil revenues” (p. 13).  
Worse, while the GoG states may 
control the oil fields, they do not 
own them.  
 
State fragility suggests lack of 
meaningful relationship and 
fellowship between the state and the 
citizens. In an era of blossoming 
electoralism – elections are generally 
held when and as due, even though 
many of them are hardly free and 
fair, let alone free from fear – this 
lack of trust has birthed a distrustful 
and cynical citizenry. Venerated 
political economist, Samir Amin, 
(2004: 1) has argued that 
“democratization demands that its 
reach is felt in social and economic 
spheres, not to be restricted to just 
the political sphere”. The state‟s 
democracy and legitimacy deficits 
have resulted in a type of democracy 
that is devoid of social justice, social 
citizenship and social distribution of 
goods and values. Many GoG 
governments have lost the moral 
right to collect taxes from the 
citizens thus missing out on the 
possibility of a healthy relationship 
with the citizenry through taxation 
(Shaxson, 2007: 1126). Also lost is 
the important lesson that tax 
collection has, historically, 
contributed to the emergence of 
strong states, democratic institutions 
and human development. 
 
A major response to the state‟s 
paucity and leanness in political 
economy terms is the use, by non-
state actors, of economics of 
entitlement and political agitation for 
resource control as a major 
mobilization tool. This dynamic is 
most entrenched in the Niger Delta, 
but it is a general pattern in the GoG, 
notably in Angola‟s Cabinda 
conclave (Watts, 2008: 27). It 
explains what, for some, are criminal 
activities such as pipeline vandalism, 
illegal bunkering, kidnapping for 
ransom and piracy but which, for 
others, are no more than bold, if 
often violent and destructive, 
expressions of pertinent issues of 
disenfranchisement, 
disempowerment, alienation, 
resource control and class/political 
struggle. 
 
National Sovereignty        
In legal and theoretical terms, the 
notion of national sovereignty 
stipulates that states have suzerainty 
over their public space and territorial 
integrity and are masters of their own 
destinies. In functional democracies, 
sovereignty belongs to the people 
who in turn delegate it to their 
elected representatives. In the real 
world, however, states are more or 
less sovereign depending on the 
extent of their strength or fragility in 
domestic and external terms. Max 
Sesay (1995: 187) has made the 
important point that “when state 
institutions and the national interest 
are subordinated to the interests of 
groups or individuals in society, state 
paralysis is inevitable”. He adds that 
“with roots in the colonial period, 
weak state capacity in the 3
rd
 world 
is the outcome of a complex 
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interaction of both internal and 
external forces”.  
 
Two major factors account for this 
development. The first is the 
evolving nature of sovereignty in the 
contemporary era where, according 
to Hardt and Negri (2000 cited in 
Southall, 2009: 24), empire has 
replaced imperialism. They define 
empire as a “decentred and 
deterritorialising apparatus of rule 
that progressively incorporates the 
entire global realm within its open, 
expanding frontiers”. They add that 
in the empire of the post-modern era, 
sovereignty consists of “a series of 
national and supranational organisms 
united under a single logic of rule”. 
These operate within an interlocking 
regulatory framework.  
 
Sovereignty appears delimited and 
limited by supranational institutions 
and key external actors over whom 
fragile African states exercise little 
or no control. Strong and powerful 
states remain dominant and 
hegemonic under an increasingly 
globalized system. They call the 
shots everywhere and the fragile 
states, excessively weaned on FDIs 
and donor funding, suffer what they 
must in their hands. Many states in 
the latter group have little more than 
pro-forma, putative or formal 
sovereignty. This alludes to the point 
made earlier about GoG states 
controlling but not owning the oil 
wells in their own soil. Within this 
perspective, Shaxson (2007: 1125) 
misses the point when he claims that 
“nobody in Angola‟s oil industry 
would dispute that today it is the 
Angolan oil company, Sonangol, not 
ExxonMobil or BP or Sinopec that 
calls the shots”.  
 
Although very problematic because 
of GoG governments‟ excessive 
dependence on giant oil firms for 
revenues and the backing these firms 
enjoy from powerful western powers 
(Harshe, 2003: 115), international or 
foreign assistance to police or pacify 
conflict zones is not foreclosed. As 
Obasi (2011: 71) has argued, 
however, “such assistance must be 
weighed carefully … to ensure it 
does not contribute to the 
suppression of legitimate protests or 
to further human rights violation …” 
GoG states would also have to deal 
with a further erosion of their 
sovereignty: the “minimal 
accountability of multinational 
companies and donors to host 
governments” (Southall and 
Comninos, 2009: 360). More or less 
effective national sovereignty 
demands no less. 
 
The second major factor relates to 
the history of sovereignty loss in 
many an African state. The 
deregulation and privatization 
policies and measures dictated by the 
World Bank and the IMF in the mid-
1980s and imposed on much of 
Africa severely undermined the 
continent‟s economic sovereignty 
and the strength of the state. 
Sovereignty appears extremely 
dubious and superfluous without a 
strong, legitimate and democratic 
state. In the same vein, “a necessary 
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corollary to the principle of 
territorial sovereignty is the principle 
of territorial integrity” (Lagoni, 
1979: 217). Ordinary Africans have 
been sentenced to a regime of 
permanent austerity and sacrifice. 
Similarly, the ruling and policy elites 
in these countries have been forced 
to play little more than a „comprador 
role‟ on behalf of global capital 
(Southall and Comninos, 2009: 359). 
Many of them appear to enjoy this 
role as they regularly cut deals with 
key transnational actors that, in the 
words of Southall (2009: 30), “are of 
advantage to them but operate at 
great cost to the general welfare of 
their fellow African citizens”. 
 
GoG states are expected to 
materialize their national sovereignty 
differently within the context of oil 
rent receipts and a debilitating rentier 
mentality. This is because they 
experience different levels of 
vulnerability. Some make themselves 
available for neo-colonial 
exploitation more than others. They 
are at contrasting depths of the 
corruption morass, with many of 
them featuring in the unenviable 
league of the globe‟s most corrupt 
nations. They are also bound 
together by the copious absence of 
purposeful, visionary and missionary 
political leaders who could act as 
effective agents of change and 
gradually build strong, democratic 
institutions for the public good. 
Many political elites in the GoG 
petro-states have proved unable and 
unwilling to rise above their personal 
self-aggrandizement and elite 
interests to do this. “Oil in itself 
means nothing”, writes Terry Karl 
(in Yohannes, 2003: 15). “What 
matters are the social and political 
and economic institutions in which it 
is inserted. Oil can be a force for 
development or it can be a major 
impetus for war”. Obi (2011: 113) 
underlines the point that “oil is what 
those with power make it, not what it 
makes them, Oil can‟t „act‟ 
independent of intervening factors”.  
 
Thus, Equatorial Guinea which sends 
two-thirds of its oil to the US has 
allowed the oil companies to keep 87 
per cent of the oil receipts. This 
generosity hurts national sovereignty 
and interest compared to 50 per cent 
in many other developing nations 
(Yohannes, 2003: 9). The country 
also reportedly obtained in the recent 
past only a meager 39 per cent of the 
revenues raised from oil in a typical 
contract. This figure compares very 
unfavorably with 78.4 per cent 
(Gabon), 76 per cent (DRC) and 70.2 
per cent (Nigeria), with the caveat 
that the last two examples related, 
respectively, to deeper, offshore 
water areas.  
 
In Nigeria, the deregulation of the 
mining sector under the Nigerian 
Investment Promotion Council 
(NIPC) Decree 1995 allowed for a 
100 per cent foreign ownership of 
mining operations and related 
enterprises. It also allowed free 
repatriation of capital, profits and 
dividends (Olusakin, 2006: 23).   
 
In Angola, journalist and human 
rights activist, Rafael Marquel de 
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Morais, brought a complaint in 
August 2013 against the Vice-
President, Manuel Vincente, 
accusing him of breaking the 
country‟s law on conflict of interest 
by not relinquishing his position as a 
director in China Sonangol 
International Holding, a Chinese-
owned company with extensive oil 
and related interests in Angola 
(Africa-Asia Confidential, September 
2013).   
 
There have been some attempts to 
win back part of the lost sovereignty. 
The advent of national oil companies 
(NOCs) in countries such as Nigeria, 
Equatorial Guinea and Angola has 
enhanced the bargaining power of 
petro states “to demand more in 
exchange for access to their oil 
reserves” (Obi, 2009: 203). Since 
2000, the Nigerian state has taken 
some important decisions in an 
attempt to control its oil industry. 
These include: increase to 70 per 
cent of the industry‟s local content 
by 2007; divestment of state shares 
in the downstream sector; and the 
reservation of a 10 per cent quota for 
indigenous participation in each oil 
mining license (OML) granted to 
foreign investors. Others are the sale 
of oil companies to indigenous 
investors, notably Conoil and Oando 
and attempt by the government to get 
Shell and Exxon Mobil to make 
outstanding payments valued at over 
$1 billion on production sharing 
contracts (PSCs) signed with the 
NNPC for the Bonga and Erha 
oilfields (Obi, 2009: 206).  
 
In September 2013, Chad froze the 
activities of the China National 
Petroleum Company (CNPC) for 
illegally dumping waste oil in the 
Bongor Basin (Africa-Asia 
Confidential, September 2013). The 
Angolan government has passed a 
legislation to increase local 
participation and ownership to a 
minimum of 35 per cent in all 
foreign investments. Foreign oil 
companies are also mandated to give 
preference to local staff and 
resources (USEIA, “Angola”). 
 
The Nigerian Petroleum Industry Bill 
(PIB), described as “the first attempt 
to restructure the Nigerian oil 
industry to enforce sustainability, 
transparency and greater control over 
her natural resources” (Rasheed, 
2011) is the country‟s boldest 
attempt since juridical independence 
in 1960 to make the industry truly 
serve national interest. But nearly ten 
years after it was first introduced in 
the National Assembly, it has yet to 
be passed into law and its contents 
have, by most accounts, been 
watered down. Among others, the 
Bill seeks to increase the royalties 
payable to the Nigerian state by the 
TOCs and to determine the crude 
outputs at the points of production 
rather than at the points of export, 
the current practice. It also provides 
for the payment by oil majors of ten 
per cent of their oil earnings to the 
oil-bearing and producing 
communities.  
 
A coalition of foreign and local 
interests which considers the Bill‟s 
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provisions too radical has sought to 
frustrate its passage to law. Both the 
presidency and the National 
Assembly have been under intense 
pressure to either wholly jettison the 
bill or pass a hallowed-out version 
that will be inconsistent with its 
original intention. The Bill has also 
pitched the Nigerian government and 
oil majors against each other with the 
latter appearing to have the upper 
hand with the active support of their 
home governments. They want the 
status quo to remain because it is 
extremely skewed in their favor, 
insisting that “a contract is a contract 
that must be respected by all parties” 
(Rasheed, 2011).  
 
It remains to be seen when and to 
what extent the Nigerian government 
will give effect to its reputation of 
not condoning “a security response 
like the one offshore Somalia where 
western forces dictate planning and 
execution” (Katsouris and Sayne, 
2013: 48).    
 
Foreign Interests                         
Nothing suggests, in theory, that 
there can be no meeting ground 
between national interests and 
foreign interests. Ideals and 
principles, however enunciated, 
drive policies. But the Africa policy 
of the great powers hardly espouses, 
let alone defends, any great ideals, 
principles or normative values 
which, ordinarily, should protect 
everyone, including the most 
victimized. In practice, there is an 
aggressive pursuit of national geo-
strategic, economic and political 
interests often out of sync with grand 
public rhetoric on human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law 
(Yohannes, 2003: 13). The US and 
its key European allies intervene in 
conflicts either to protect their 
investments or create opportunities 
to invest. Indeed, the highest rates of 
foreign investment (and economic 
growth) are not found in African 
countries with rising democratic 
credentials, but in those, such as oil 
producers Angola, Equatorial 
Guinea, Nigeria and Sudan and 
mineral-rich countries such as the 
DRC, “whose governance credentials 
are highly dubious but which possess 
resources that are most in global 
demand” (Southall and Melber, 
2009: 411).  
 
This explains the phenomenon of the 
looting and plundering of African 
resources by foreign capital, 
including foreign assistance, in 
alliance with ruling elites. According 
to the Africa Progress Report (BBC 
News Africa, 10 May 2013), a 
combination of tax avoidance, secret 
mining deals and financial transfers 
bleeds Africa of its resource boom. 
The practice whereby companies 
shift profits to lower tax jurisdictions 
costs the continent about $38 billion 
annually. Kofi Annan claims that 
“Africa loses twice as much money 
through these loopholes as it gets 
from donors”. He compares its effect 
to “taking food off the tables of the 
poor” (BBC News Africa, 10 May 
2013). While Southall and Melber 
(2009: 418) emphasize the “wholly 
unproductive expropriation of 
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economic surplus by local elites and 
the export of huge commissions and 
profits to financial havens overseas”, 
Watts (2008: 32) argues that “the 
pillaging and privatization of the 
state and the African Commons is 
the most extraordinary spectacle of 
primitive accumulation by 
dispossession, all made in the name 
of foreign assistance”.  
 
As already indicated, the main 
concern of the „international 
community‟ – an extremely vexed 
and nebulous umbrella terminology 
that shields the US and the European 
Union (EU) from international 
contestation, ridicule and 
opprobrium -- has been to secure its 
energy interests and prevent a 
regional spread of instability 
everywhere (Obi, 2011: 116). Thus, 
since the 1990s, the Anglo-American 
powers have, for instance, opted for 
energy security and corporate profits 
with the spread of democracy used as 
bait (Harshe, 2003: 115). On 
balance, their activities are not so 
much about promoting good 
governance and supporting 
democracy as they are about 
business as usual, keeping the 
wretched status quo intact. It is also 
about international investment and 
oil majors securing a niche in the 
GoG states (Roll, 2011: 15). For the 
sake of oil, the US struck out 
Equatorial Guinea from a list of 
fourteen countries with a 
questionable human rights record 
and re-opened its consulate which 
had been shut down during the Bill 
Clinton presidency supposedly on 
budgetary grounds (Servant and 
Forster, 2003: 141). These powers 
are undeterred by criminal behavior 
and deteriorating security situation in 
some of the states (McSherry, 2006: 
37).  
 
Ambiguity is the name of the game 
here: the great powers blame the oil 
states for the destabilizing effects of 
their narrow oil and broader 
domestic policies, but continue to 
bolster and enhance the military 
capacity of these states through 
sundry military-driven capacity 
building and training programs. The 
African High Command 
(AFRICOM) that came on stream in 
2007 (see below) is arguably the best 
known, but the list is a long one. 
This includes Africa Contingency 
Operations Training Assistance 
(ACOTA), Trans-Saharan 
Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI), 
Global Peace Operations Initiative 
(GPOI) and State Partnership 
Programs (SPP). These Washington-
inspired programs and structures are 
entrenching militarism without any 
corresponding policies on 
accelerating those conditions that 
favor “democracy, social justice, 
equity, production and redistribution 
of wealth and popular rule in Africa” 




The United States of America 
It has been argued that before the Al-
Qaeda terrorist attacks on the US on 
11 September 2001 (or 9/11), Africa 
had an inconsequential strategic 
significance for the US. While still 
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arguably the least prioritized in 
Washington‟s strategic plans and 
reviews, the post 9/11 period has 
witnessed an expansion of US 
military engagement in Africa 
(Piombo, 2007).         
 
Yet, the US has always appeared 
paranoid about Africa‟s natural 
resources, which explains why 
nearly 80 per cent of total American 
investment in SSA is in the energy 
sector (Yohannes, 2003: 2, 12). This 
comes in the form of both public and 
private funds, with the US 
government working in concert with 
oil companies. The latter invested 
over $40 billion in the GoG between 
1994 and 2004 and projected 
spending about $30 between 2005 
and 2010 (Watts, 2008: 28). With 
about five per cent of the world‟s 
population, the US is responsible for 
about 25 per cent of annual global oil 
consumption.  
 
The centre-piece of Clinton‟s Africa 
policy between 1992 and 2000 was 
the enablement of US transnational 
companies to control Africa‟s natural 
resources. The securitization of the 
continent‟s oil fields through military 
policies and alliances is the brain 
child of sundry US think tanks. 
These advocated a special 
partnership between Washington and 
the GoG states to articulate an 
energy policy to include the discrete 
deployment of US forces to the 
region to oversee political stability 
and secure the oil fields (Yohannes, 
2003: 2, 10). AFRICOM is 
emblematic of the militarization of 
US energy policy in Africa (Watts, 
2008: 29; Heine, 2007; Isike, 
Uzodike and Gilbert, 2008). Through 
this structure, the US provides 
military assistance to „friendly‟ GoG 
states. AFRICOM, structured to 
operate through multilateral and 
regional initiatives (Klare and 
Volman, 2006: 616), was officially 
presented as a tool to foster Africa‟s 
development and security, strengthen 
the US security cooperation with 
Africa and create new opportunities 
to bolster the capacity of African 
states to deal with threats to their 
stability and security. As in the 
Caspian Sea, the sole requirement on 
the part of the Africans is their 
willingness to participate in the anti-
terror war.  
 
The lack of emphasis on the use of 
„soft power‟ for the creation of a 
people-friendly development, 
security and governance 
ecology/framework and the 
articulation of a balanced or non-
zero-sum partnership with Africa 
raises fundamental questions about 
the true intentions of the military 
command structure. To the extent 
that different value and reference 
frames inform the security concerns 
and interests of the GoG states and 
the US, it is necessary to articulate 
an alternative basis for genuine and 
mutually beneficial partnership 
(Amuwo, 2009: 244).  
 
The George Bush Jr‟s administration 
(2000-2008) perceived African oil as 
a “strategic national interest and thus 
a resource that the US might choose 
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to use military force to control” 
(Keenan, 2005: 403). While 
American, British and French navies 
patrolled the GoG, the administration 
also sought to revamp and re-equip 
the navies of the states in the region 
under its maritime security 
cooperation agreements (Schneider 
and Vircoulon, 2013). Its policy on 
the procurement of African oil 
resulted from the National Energy 
Policy of 17 May 2001, the final 
report of the National Energy Policy 
Development Group (NEPDG) or the 
Cheney Report, named after the vice-
president, the group‟s chair (Klare 
and Volman, 2006: 612). This report 
identifies the GoG as a foremost 
source of oil and gas for the US 
market (Obi, 2009: 193). 
Washington has also shown keen 
interest in the World Bank-driven 
Chad-Cameroon Petroleum 
Development and Pipeline Project 
(CCPP) and the West Africa Gas 
Pipeline Project (WAGPP). In 
addition to guaranteeing constant oil 
flows, the US government is also 
concerned to “stem transnational 
threats like narcotics and arms trade, 
piracy and illegal fishing” (Obi, 
2009: 195).  
 
Contrary to popular expectation in 
Africa, President Barrack Obama has 
introduced no paradigm-shifting 
policies in favor of the continent. 
Since 2008, Obama‟s Africa foreign 
policy has showed neither altruism 
nor world-benefaction, but the old, 
hard-nosed, well-worn realpolitik. 
He not only “presides over a national 
security apparatus that in many ways 
resembles the one left behind by GW 
Bush … he has embraced and in 
some cases expanded the counter-
terrorism policies that caused Bush 
to run afoul of civil libertarian 
rights” (Kuhnhenn, 2013).  
 
Obama‟s snappy visit to Ghana in 
2009 – his only African visit during 
his first term – presented by his 
advisers as a pro-democracy trip – 
was seen by some as meant to 
“negotiate big oil deals for American 
oil majors” (Enwegbara, 2013). 
Similarly, his latest pet project – the 
Power Africa Project (PAP), 
enunciated during his safari visits to 
Senegal, South Africa and Tanzania 
in July 2013 – targets newly-
discovered oil and gas reserves and 
renewable energy in Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria and 
Tanzania (Reinl, 2013; Goldman and 
Taler, 2013). Obama has responded 
to China‟s strategic growth on the 
continent with increased American 
military presence, including by 
stationing forces in some twelve 
countries (Samatar, 2013, Mead, 
2013). Under his watch, the locus 
and focus of the war on terror 
appears to have shifted away from 
South and West Asia to Africa 
(Samatar, 2013).  
 
EU strategic concerns in the Gulf 
have fed into the US interest in 
stemming the Niger Delta militancy. 
The result is the establishment of the 
GoG Energy Security Strategy 
(GGESS). In December 2005, the 
US Ambassador to Nigeria and 
NNPC‟s Managing Director agreed 
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to set up special committees “to 
coordinate action against trafficking 
in small arms in the Niger Delta, 
bolster maritime and coastal security 
in the region, promote community 
development and poverty reduction 
and combat money laundering and 
other financial crimes” (Watts, 2008: 
29). The US energy strategy thinks 
far afield as part of its containment 
strategy vis-à-vis China, arguably 
Washington‟s main rival in the GoG.   
 
China       
Washington‟s high-intensity 
militarist intrusion on the continent 
is rivaled by the relatively low-
intensity intervention by China. In 
the past decade or so, China‟s 
visibility in West and Central Africa 
has become so pronounced that the 
US can no longer hide its irritation 
and nervousness. Having emerged 
from the late 2008 financial crisis as 
a leading actor in international 
financial markets, it was only a 
matter of time for China to become a 
major player in the GoG. Beijing has 
many things going for it. It is the 
globe‟s second major economic 
power and poised to overtake the US 
before 2030. China is the largest 
holder of US government securities. 
It also controls about 30 per cent of 
global reserves (UNCTAD, 2011). 
Its trade with Africa is about $200 
billion, more than twice that of the 
US (Reinl, 2013).  
 
Sino-African relations have been 
described as one of „economic-
driven pragmatism‟ in contrast to the 
„political-driven idealism‟ of the past 
(Wenping, 2007). Three dominant 
perspectives describe the relations – 
China as an economic competitor, a 
development partner and a new 
hegemon. 
 
China‟s Africa policy is driven by 
the desire to access the continent‟s 
fossil energy resources and other 
minerals and metals (notably 
aluminum, uranium, bauxite, 
manganese and iron ore). Between 
1995 and 2005, Chinese oil 
consumption doubled to 6.8 million 
bpd, reinforcing its position as the 
second largest oil consumer after the 
US and ahead of Japan. The 
expansion of leading Chinese 
national oil companies -- such as the 
China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) and the China 
Petroleum Chemical Corporation 
(SINOPEC) -- into Africa and other 
parts of the globe has been greatly 
enhanced by the liberalization and 
decentralization of that country‟s 
energy sector in the past 25 years or 
so (Downs, 2007: 53). 
 
Many African governments have 
tended to see Chinese capital as more 
benign and less intrusive of their 
sovereignty (Southall and Melber, 
2009: 420). This stance suits Beijing 
very well, thus its investments and 
trade signatures litter the continent‟s 
financial landscape. China is not 
only the continent‟s leading lender 
and infrastructure investor; it is also 
its second trading partner. By most 
accounts, China‟s investment in 
Africa has increased by a staggering 
thirty fold since 2005. No fewer than 
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2,000 Chinese firms are present in 50 
African countries. According to 
Africa Infrastructure and Power 
Forum (AIPF), “this number 
continues to grow at a phenomenal 
pace as the Sino-Africa ties grow 
stronger”.  
 
Chinese development needs drive its 
aid, trade and investment in Africa, 
as elsewhere. This is a threat to the 
continent‟s development. Chinese 
capital – not unlike its western 
counterpart – has the capacity to 
marginalize nascent African capital 
(Southall and Comninos, 2009: 364).  
 
China is the principal supplier of 
light weapons not only to African 
governments but also the intra-state 
armed groups seeking to tear them 
apart. Reputed to be lethal – on 
average, no fewer than half a million 
people are felled annually by them – 
small arms continue to proliferate, 
with about 640 million in circulation 
by 2005. Important international 
initiatives appeared to have been 
observed in the breach. These 
notably include the 1998 Moratorium 
on the Import, Export and 
Manufacture of Small Arms and 
Light Weapons in West Africa, 
driven by ECOWAS and the 2002 
Wassenaar Arrangement Best 
Practice Guidelines for Exports of 
Small Arms and Light Weapons, 
endorsed by a majority of global 
arms manufacturers and exporters 
(UNDP, 2005: 173). In 2013, 
estimates of small arms and light 
weapons in circulation globally vary 
from 500 million (according to the 
AU‟s Peace and Security Council, 
100 million of which it claims are in 
Africa) to „at least 875 million‟, 
according to the UN Department for 
Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). 
 
China‟s „soft „power‟ diplomatic 
offensive on the continent; its 
rhetoric of „historical friendship, 
equality and common development 
with Africa‟; it‟s so-called „special 
relationship‟, shared history‟, „no 
political strings attached‟ and „non-
interference‟ aid policy (the 
„business is business, politics is 
politics‟ approach); „respect for 
dignity and sovereignty‟, „the poor 
helping the poor‟ and „win-win 
cooperation policy‟ (Wenping, 2007; 
Marysse and Geenen, 2009) – all of 
this appears to mask a foreign policy 
pursuit that is no less hard-nosed 
than the foreign policy orientations 
of Beijing‟s western competitors.     
 
In consequence, for all of the West‟s 
critique of China‟s methodology of 
infiltration into Africa, Beijing‟s 
approach is no different from that 
adopted by the US, the UK and 
France. “All the major western 
powers have long used whatever 
means and influence available to 
them to secure access to African oil, 
including economic incentives, 
diplomacy and provision of arms and 
military equipment” (Klare and 
Volman, 2006: 622). The suggestion 
is that if China has “an almost 
insatiable appetite for markets” 
(Melber and Southall, 2009: xxiv), it 
shares this characteristic with the 
west. 
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A final thought in this section: where 
oil is involved, it is not always easy 
to clearly dichotomize between 
domestic and external interests. Both 
get easily mixed and blurred. Obi 
(2011: 11) contends that the state, 
the dominant ruling factions and the 
transnational elites and processes 
drive oil politics. In his study of the 
World Bank‟s involvement in the 
CCPP, Roll (2011: 19) concludes 
that “external influence is very 
limited and … in the end, domestic 
politics rules”. He adds that the oil-
rich states and the TOCs implicated 
in the project -- as well as individual 
consumers -- have inadvertently 
become “partners in exploitation and 
repression” (p. 22). Both the World 
Bank and President Idris Déby of 
Chad gave what turned out to be 
hollow promises on the project. The 
Bank promised Chad that oil monies 
would not be lost to either corruption 
or mismanagement and that petro-
dollars would be channeled to the 
country‟s poor. At the inauguration 
of the pipeline in 2003, Déby assured 
that “the development of the crude 
oil will benefit the entire Chadian 
nation” (Keenan, 2005: 403).  
 
Notwithstanding the growing 
strategic interest of the great powers 
in the GoG‟s oil and gas reserves, 
precious little has been done by these 
countries to contain and curtail oil 
theft. While Nigeria‟s Niger Delta is 
the GoG‟s epicenter and its oil ranks 
as the finest and the best, the theft of 
its oil which rises as oil prices spike 
in the global market has received 
only nodding global attention. 
“Nigeria‟s oil theft is a species of 
organized crime that is almost totally 
off the international community‟s 
radar”, write Katsouris and Sayne 
(2013: 12). “There has been no 
international law enforcement 
activity around the Nigerian oil theft 
… multilateral bodies are not active 
in the area either”. Yet, the stolen oil 
trade touches many nations; between 
2009 and 2011 stolen oil found 
buyers in some 37 countries (ibid, p. 
13). The UK which prioritizes 
terrorism, piracy, armed robbery, 
narcotics, illegal fishing and 
weapons trafficking makes no 
mention of oil theft (ibid, p. 48). In 
the same vein, “multi stakeholder 
transparency initiatives do not seem 
very willing to talk about oil theft” 
(ibid, p. 66). 
 
Local Bunkering in the Niger 
Delta epicenter  
The Niger Delta region is peopled by 
ethno-nationalities who may or may 
not have always lived together 
peacefully in pre-colonial, colonial 
and post-colonial eras, but who are 
united by potential and actual 
popular political resistance against 
local, national and transnational 
exploitation of the oil and gas their 
communities bear. What binds these 
communities together is the 
appalling human development 
indices summed up by, among 
others, deepening poverty, social 
instability, poor local governance, 
infrastructure neglect and 
environmental degradation (Amuwo, 
2009a). The latter is an extremely 
grave issue and would require, 
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according to Kingsley Kuku, 
President Goodluck Jonathan‟s 
special adviser on Niger Delta, about 
a trillion dollar to restore. Kuku says 
that the devastation in the region was 
caused by crude theft, illegal 
bunkering and oil exploration 
activities (Nwachukwu and Eboh, 
2013).  
 
Bunkering simply refers to the 
process of loading or feeding oil into 
the tanks or engines of ships with a 
view to moving the product from 
port to destination. This simple 
exercise is deemed legal or licit 
when it is done with valid license 
and according to “the laws and 
guidelines made by the state 
institutions regulating shipping, oil 
transactions and national security” 
(Obasi, 2011: 57). When undertaken 
otherwise, it is at once illicit and 
illegal. This is what is referred to as 
oil theft, a phenomenon which 
appears to be both a symptom and a 
cause of the violent conflict in the 
Niger Delta (Katsouris and Sayne, 
2013; Obasi, 2011; Watts, 2008). It 
is an extremely lucrative practice, 
though its financial fortunes often 
obey swings in oil prices. According 
to Collier and Hoeffler (cited in 
Oyefusi, 2008: 543, Note 9), 
organized groups in the Niger Delta 
earn up to a billion USD per year 
from large-scale bunkering. An 
estimate shows that between 2003 
and 2012 4,779 oil thefts occurred, 
180 of them in 2012 (Katsouris and 
Sayne, 2013: 15).   
 
Several factors have conspired, over 
the years, to provide an enabling 
environment for oil bunkering and 
entrench the practice. The first is the 
complex scenario of Nigeria‟s oil 
industry characterized by high-wire 
politics, „poli-tricks‟, politicking, 
sleaze and graft. Watts (2008: 38) 
speaks to a cocktail of bazaar type of 
politics, a corrupt and violent petro-
state and irresponsible oil company 
practices. Pervasive illegality and 
political corruption in the legal 
supply of oil tapers into the illegal 
domain thus thinning and blurring 
the line between licit and illicit oil 
trade. NNPC‟s complex and opaque 
term-contract system of selling 
Nigeria‟s crude to the international 
market has attracted sundry shadowy 
middlemen and politically exposed 
and connected individuals as fronts 
for national and international big 
players (Katsouris and Sayne, 2013: 
7). Since May 1999, Nigeria‟s 
elected governments have done 
precious little to ameliorate the 
situation. The country‟s oil sector is 
regarded as one of the least 
transparent globally. In a 2010 
survey of 44 national and 
international energy companies by 
the Revenue Watch Institute (RWI) 
and TI, the NNPC brought up the 
rear (Katsouris and Sayne, 2013: 9).  
 
The second major factor is the large 
pool of discontented and disgruntled 
young men -- and women -- in the 
Niger Delta for whom oil bunkering 
is perhaps the easiest and most 
lucrative means to escape grinding 
poverty. It is in this sense that Watts 
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(2008: 37) analyses local bunkering 
as “a financial mechanism through 
which militants finance their 
operations and attract recruits after 
being abandoned by their political 
patrons”. He adds that “the theft of 
oil provides a lubricant for a ready 
existing set of grievances” (ibid.). 
 
Oil theft takes place in all of 
Nigeria‟s six major territorial water 
zones, largely located in the core 
states of Delta, Rivers and Bayelsa. 
The Sombreiro-Bonny-BOT/Andoni-
Opobo region in Rivers state leads 
the pack in terms of the 
sophistication of the operations.  The 
Escravos-Forcados-Ramos-Dodo 
region in Delta state is arguably the 
most dangerous due to the number of 
armed and criminal groups involved 
and their often ferocious clashes 
(Obasi, 2011: 58). Illicit bunkering 
also goes on in the country‟s 24 
export terminals (Katsouris and 
Sayne, 2013: 26).  
 
The literature talks about three major 
types of oil bunkering ranging from 
small-scale through medium to large-
scale operations and depicting 
activities carried out either by „boys‟ 
or „barons‟. Almost intuitively, 
small-scale operations are the 
preserve of the „boys‟ who know the 
swamps, creeks and mangroves of 
the Delta very well. They constitute 
local gangs who specialize in tapping 
into pipelines, stealing, diverting and 
smuggling oil within and outside 
Nigeria. About 30,000 barrels of oil 
are reportedly lost daily through this 
process. The second type is more 
technical, involving larger quantities 
of oil through „hot tapping‟, loading 
small barges and feeding bigger 
trawlers offshore. It is estimated that 
about 200,000 barrels per day are 
lost, representing some ten per cent 
of the country‟s total daily exports. 
The third and final type is the 
exclusive domain of the barons who 
specialize in lifting oil in excess of 
the amounts officially licensed.  
  
Implicated in what is a vast 
multibillion dollar industry are high-
ranking security   officials 
(especially police, army and navy), 
senior government officials and 
politicians, politically exposed or 
well-connected oil traders and 
merchants; local criminal elements 
and syndicates that are linked to 
international criminal networks 
running the illegal oil trade 
(Katsouris and Sayne, 2013; Brock, 
2013; Obasi, 2011: 60-61, 71 and 
Watts, 2008: 37). The latter involves 
several countries, including some of 
Nigeria‟s immediate neighbors 
(Benin, Ghana, Cameroon, and Côte 
d‟Ivoire) which serve as either transit 
or destination hubs for stolen oil. 
Extra-African countries suspected to 
be implicated are a legion: Eastern 
Europe (whose “ageing refineries 
have a reputation for asking few 
questions about the origins of their 
crude”, according to Katsouris and 
Sayne, 2013: 33); the Balkans, 
China, Brazil, Cuba, Singapore, 
India, Thailand, Indonesia and the 
US. The international criminal 
networks are master-minded by 
Ukrainians, Russians, Romanians, 
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Greeks and Filipinos. As Obasi 
(2011: 61), has averred, “a single 
operation could involve a 
multinational network working 
together”.   
 
There are two sides of the coin here. 
On the one hand, because of 
apparent official complicity in oil 
theft, it has been suggested that this 
practice is a “„Nigerian political 
problem‟ which officials could fix if 
they wanted to” (Katsouris and 
Sayne, 2013: 20). On the other, 
contractors and staff of international 
oil companies get enmeshed in oil 
theft. While a recent report claims 
there is no clear evidence on the 
issue though rumors persists, the 
same report goes on to indicate that 
“a series of incidents in June 2013 
around a section of the Trans-Niger 
Pipeline in Rivers state operated by 
Shell, raised the issue of misconduct 
by staff and contractors” (Katsouris 
and Sayne, 2013: 22). Also 
immersed in the oil theft matrix as 
accessories, facilitators and 
collaborators of sorts are host 
communities, their elders and youth 
organizations/leaders who get paid as 
„passage communities‟ – akin to 
alleged protection payments by oil 
thieves to security operatives (Obasi, 
2011: 60; Katsouris and Sayne, 
2013: 7).  
 
While the annual value of oil stolen 
from Nigeria estimated at between 
$3 and $8 billion dollars pales into 
insignificance compared to $550 
billion, the annual value of drugs 
sold globally (Brock, 2013a; 
Katsouris and Sayne, 2013: 17), it is 
a huge loss to Nigeria‟s ailing mono-
cultural economy. But the negative 
impact of local bunkering on the 
region‟s political economy runs 
deeper than petro-dollar losses. The 
Nigerian state„s legitimacy and 
credibility are regularly called to 
question; human security is in 
constant jeopardy; and deepening 
uncertainty around the safety of 
pipelines and other infrastructure 
constantly threatens system 
shutdown. While the Nigerian Navy 
claimed that in 2012 alone it 
successfully destroyed over 7000 
illegal or primitive refineries, 
detained over 900 canoes and about 
40 larger vessels, oil theft appears 
increasingly entrenched and has 
blighted the country‟s oil earnings.  
 
In August 2013, the Accountant-
General for the Federation 
announced that the country‟s gross 
oil revenues had fallen by 42 per 
cent in July compared to June 
(Katsouris and Sayne, 2013: 19). The 
same month, the Finance Minister 
and Coordinating Minister for the 
Economy darkly hinted that because 
of persistent and significant revenue 
drops due, among others, to 
continuous crude oil theft, leakages 
and pipeline breaks, the federal 
government might soon have 
problems paying salaries regularly. 
 
Perhaps more emblematic of the 
deeper malaise is that hardly has 
anyone – „boy‟ or „baron‟ – been 
successfully tried and imprisoned for 
oil theft in recent times. Whereas the 
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crime carries a prisons sentence of 
21 years, the last naval court martial 
took place in 2005 (Katsouris and 
Sayne, 2013: 19). The Nigerian state 
appears to lack the necessary 
political will and muscle to give 
effect to the measures, laws and 
structures it has put in place to stem 
the tide. The Inter-Agency Maritime 
Security Task Force (IAMSTF), set 
up in November 2005, to recommend 
strategies to police Nigeria‟s coastal 
waters has been dormant. Bayelsa 
state‟s deputy governor indicated in 
August 2013 that the federal 
government had already constituted a 
committee of the South-South 
governors, headed by the Delta state 
governor, to deal with the issue 
(Punch, 2013b). The Nigerian 
Extractive Industry Transparency 
Initiative (NEITI) charged with 
improving the oil industry‟s security 
and governance, has worked hard but 
has yet to make the desired impact. 
Given the deepening rot in the 
sector, NEITI has its work well cut 
out. At the regional level, neither the 
GoG Energy Security Strategy 
(GGESS) set up in 2005 to track 
ships with a radar system nor the 
GOG Guard Force meant, as from 
2007, to monitor and protect 
common maritime interest (Obasi, 
2011: 65-67) made much progress.   
 
We have already alluded to the fact 
that the international community 
cares little about Nigeria‟s oil theft, 
seeing it as no more than “a small, 
ugly anomaly” (Katsouris and Sayne, 
2013: 68). Yet, the proposal to 
develop a „finger printing system‟ to 
ease the tracking of oil from the 
Niger Delta, already on the table, 
may need international support to 
become a reality. Same goes for the 
renewed appeal by Nigerian 
authorities to the international 
community to regard stolen oil as 
„blood oil‟ (à la „blood diamond‟ at 
the peak of the Liberian and Sierra-
Leonean civil wars in the 1990s). 
Considerable diplomatic action 
needs to be deployed by Nigeria and 
other GoG member-states to follow 
up on the charm offensive on this 
issue by late President Umaru 
Yar‟Adua at the 2008 G8 Summit in 
Japan (Obasi, 2011: 68).  
 
While the call for international law 
enforcement to shut down the 
international criminal ring running 
stolen oil trade (Obasi, 2013: 71) as 
well as “improve operational 
capabilities and cooperation between 
states policing the region” (Katsouris 
and Sayne, 2013: 48)  is in order, a 
more holistic approach should seek 
to complement a physical security 
approach with a human security 
framework. After all, if the citizenry 
is happy, the nation, however 
defined, will be okay and secure. The 
Nigerian government should move 
quickly to recompose the social 
contract currently in tatters and re-
insert the state back into the public 
space and the policy matrix as a 
benevolent force for public good. It 
should also urgently address 
inadequate information and 
inconsistency in government policies 
that combine with prevailing 
insecurity in the Niger Delta to limit 
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investment and drive up the cost of 
oil and gas business in Nigeria 
(Okere, 2013). Other GoG states 
should follow suit.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper has showed -- both 
implicitly and explicitly -- that there 
is nothing accursed about the GoG‟s 
rich oil and gas outlay. Greed and 
covetousness by the great powers 
and TOCs has turned a potential 
blessing into a veritable burden, in 
unbridled and short-sighted collusion 
with the ruling elites in the states 
concerned. As Obi (2007: 399) has 
argued, “the real threat is not from 
oil, it is from those hegemonic global 
forces to whom oil means everything 
– whose supply at all times must be 
guaranteed at any cost, if need be, by 
force. It is the premium that these 
forces – all outside Africa – place on 
oil, everywhere it exists in the world 
and the competition between them 
over the remaining of the world‟s 
shrinking oil reserves that are the 
real threat”.     
 
The great powers‟ narrow military 
solution to conflict and violence in 
the oil-rich GoG has not worked, is 
not working and is not likely to work 
in future. This is because the 
dynamic of national sovereignty and 
foreign interest around the oil and 
gas complex in the region requires 
not only the physical security of oil 
wells, business and workers, but also 
the human security of the people 
most victimized by the oil business. 
More specifically, the US‟ dominant 
militaristic agenda in the GoG and 
elsewhere on the continent which has 
promoted underdevelopment and 
violence (Ray, 2013) needs to be 
urgently addressed with a view to 
transforming it.  
 
GoG leaders should work in concert, 
as well as with ECOWAS, to 
promote the interests of their people 
and the region‟s long-term 
development at the expense of short-
term elite visions and gains. They 
should negotiate with the TOCs and 
foreign governments and institutions 
on this basis. They should be willing 
and able to mind their countries‟ 
interests, promote their long-term 
development, including by 
diversifying the economy to 
considerably reduce the overweening 
dependence on oil and gas revenues.  
 
Rather than continue to lament the 
hard power designs of the US, the 
EU and China, among others, in 
Africa to protect and enhance their 
selfish interests, African 
governments should step up to the 
plate to put their houses in order, 
including by respecting the unwritten 
social contract between the state and 
the citizenry and implementing 
nationalistic socio-economic policies 
capable of lessening external 
exploitation and enhancing their 
nations‟ core interests.                   
 
In the short and medium terms, the 
following policy suggestions should 
be implemented by the GoG states to 
achieve the objectives enunciated 
above:  
 
- Emulate oil-rich states such as 
Malaysia, Thailand and Iran by 
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reducing their over-dependence 
on oil through diversification 
of their economies. 
- Change tack and begin to 
articulate and implement public 
policies on the basis of social 
equity and wealth distribution. 
The aim should be to release 
the energy, resourcefulness and 
ingenuity of the citizens and 
stimulate and motivate them to 
participate effectively in public 
affairs and be active agents of 
popular and human 
development. 
- Work with ECOWAS and the 
African Union (AU) to deal 
with the issue of Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) as net creditors to 
the rest of the world in annual 
capital flight. SSA‟s external 
assets are about three times 
more than the stock of debt 
owed to the world.  
- Act in concert to negotiate 
people-friendly and improved 
business terms with TOCs and 
their home governments. 
Nigeria should lead by example 
by urgently passing a robust 
and nationalistic PIB and 
encouraging others to do so.   
- Drastically improve 
governance, reduce corruption 
and poverty and ameliorate 
jobless growth. There is no 
better time than now to do so 
when several GoG states‟ 
economic growth is on the rise.  
 
On their part, western and other 
powers should support the conditions 
for genuine constitutional and social 
democracy in the GoG. Similarly, 
rather than militarism and 
securitization, they should privilege 
equitable and people-centered 
development in their engagement 
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